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Extradition Reform: The Role of the Judiciary 
in Protecting the Rights of a Requested 
Individual 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Growing recognition of the individual as a subject of internationallaw,l and 
emerging standards of international human rights,2 have begun to influence 
extradition3 practice in the United States.4 Although the executive branch cur-
rently gives some attention to the potential mistreatment an individual might 
suffer5 upon rendition,6 critjcs of the present system contend that political 
1 Traditionally, only states are the subjects of International Law. In more recent times, this position 
no longer receives unqualified acceptance. I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE §§ 13-13a 
(H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955). Lauterpacht notes that international legal rights and duties may exist 
despite an individual's lack of procedural capacity to assert them. H. Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the 
Law of Nations, in 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW, BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 505 
(E. Lauterpacht ed. 1975). 
2 See generally P. SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3-32 (1983) for a discussion 
of the historical development of international human rights law and the major documents that con-
stitute sources of these rights. See also Newman, Important International Human Rights Documents, Cases 
and Materials, 17 U.S.F.L. REV. 2, 3-4 (1982). 
3 Extradition has been defined as "the process by which persons charged with or convicted of crime 
against the law of a State and found in a foreign State are returned by the latter to the former for 
trial or punishment." 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 727 (1968) [hereinafter cited 
as 6 WHITEMAN]. 
4 Extradition in the United States is regulated by treaty. 18 U.S.C. § 3181; Factor v. Laubenheimer, 
290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933). Though these treaties are generally considered self-executing, Congress has 
passed legislation designed to complement and assist in their administration. See I M. BASSIOUNI, 
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE ch. 2 § I at 3 (1983) [hereinafter 
cited as BASSIOUNI]. 
5 See e.g., Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977). 
In Peroff. the court refused to consider the requested individual's claim that he would be exposed to 
potential assassination in a Swedish prison. Id. The court noted that a decision to deny extradition on 
such grounds lay within the power of the executive branch. Id. "A denial of extradition by the Executive 
may be appropriate when strong humanitarian grounds are present, but such grounds exist only when 
it appears that, if extradited, the individual will be persecuted, not prosecuted, or subjected to grave 
injustice." /d. See also Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1313, 1325-28 (1962) 
[hereinafter cited as Executive Discretion]. 
6 A distinction has been drawn between extradition as the formal means of rendition and other 
informal methods such as deportation and exclusion. See A. Evans, The Apprehension and Prosecution of 
Offenders: Some Current Problems in Legal Aspects of International Terrorism, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE 
CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 493-94 (A. Evans & J. Murphy eds. 1978). The author points 
out that in international practice, at least as it applies to the apprehension and rendition of alleged 
terrorists, deportation rather than extradition is the more commonly utilized and effective means of 
rendition.Id. at 494-95. Prof. Bassiouni points out, however, that U.S. officials have rarely used the 
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considerations often inappropriately outweigh humanitarian factors in the ex-
ecutive review process. 7 In recent attempts to revise the U.S. extradition statute,8 
Congress has considered methods of more effectively protecting requested 
persons.9 This discussion has sparked a controversy over the role of the federal 
courts in securing these rights. lO 
At present, the courts playa limited part in reviewing the motives behind an 
extradition request and the procedures or punishment which await an individual 
upon return to a requesting state. 11 While the courts l2 are responsible for 
determining the applicability of the "political offense" exception to extradition, 13 
they have generally refrained from inquiring into the treatment a person will 
receive in the custody of a requesting state. 14 Protection of an individual from 
potential human rights abuses has largely fallen to the executive branch l5 by 
virtue of its constitutional role as the "sole organ" of the conduct of U.S. foreign 
policy. 16 The Secretary of State possesses discretionary power to refuse a request 
on technical, political, or humanitarian grounds.I7 The Secretary may also con-
dition the rendition upon the requesting state's agreement to comply with 
certain specifications set out in the extradition order. 18 
immigration laws as an alternative to extradition with the possible exception of cases involving alleged 
Nazi war criminals. I BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, ch. IV § 2 at I. Rendition, as used in this article, refers 
only to extradition. 
7 See generally Banoff & Pyle, "To Surrender Political Offenders": The Political Offense Exception to 
Extradition in United States Law, 16 N.Y.U.]. INT'L L. & POL. 169, 172 (1984); L. Anderson, Protecting 
the Rights of the Requested Person in Extradition Proceedings: An Argument for a Humanitarian Exception, in 
TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 153, 163-64 (1983). 
8 There has not been a significant revision of the current F.xtradition Statute, 18 U .S.C. § 3181 et 
seq., since 1882. S. Lubet, Extradition Reform: Executive Discretion and Judicial Participation in the Extradition 
of Political Terrorists, 15 CORNELL INT'L L.]. 247, 247-48 (1982). 
9 See, e.g., Extradition Reform Act of 1981: Hearings on H.R. 5227 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 64-70 (1982) (statement of Prof. Richard Falk), 
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings 1]; Reform of the Extradition Laws of the United States: Hearings on 
H.R. 2643 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 74, 
80-83 (1983) (statement of Arthur C. Helton, Director, Political Asylum Project, Lawyers Comm. for 
Int'l Human Rts.) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings II). 
10 Id. 
II M. Bassiouni, Extradition Reform Legislation in the United States: 1981-1983,17 AKRON L. REV. 495 
(1984). 
12 An extradition complaint may be filed before any federal justice, judge, or duly authorized 
magistrate, or any judge of a state court of general jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 3184. In practice, however, 
most cases have been filed in federal courts. H.R. REP. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1984) 
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. 998]. Both the House and Senate versions of extradition reform 
proposals would require such cases to proceed in federal courts. Id. at II. 
13 See, e.g., Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 514-15 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981). 
14 Anderson, supra note 7, at 153. 
15ld. 
16 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,330 (1937). 
172 BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, ch. 9 § 7 at 3. 
181d. at 10. 
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Congressional reform hearings 19 have provided a convenient forum to debate 
the efficacy of the current practice in ensuring that extradited individuals will 
be safe from persecution and afforded some minimum standard of procedural 
fairness by the requesting state.20 Some critics of the State Department's han-
dling of these matters have urged that the courts assume a more active role. 21 
Others contend that these questions, inextricably tied to the formulation and 
conduct of foreign policy,22 are best left in the hands of the political branches.23 
Three possible models of judicial participation have emerged from the debate 
over the role of the courts when humanitarian concerns are raised in extradition 
proceedings. Under the first model, courts would be restricted from inquiring 
into events that may occur in the requesting state following extradition.24 The 
second model would allow inquiry when the alleged offender raises a fear of 
treatment in the requesting state which "shocks the conscience" of the court.25 
The third model imposes an affirmative duty upon the court to inquire into 
the potential for persecution and the "fundamental unfairness" represented by 
an extradition request. 26 
This Comment will explore the common law development of judicial action 
in this area and detail the statutory proposals which describe possible models 
of future court conduct. First, the Comment will provide an historical overview 
of the development of extraditon practices in the United States, as well as a 
brief explanation of current extradition procedures. Next, it focuses upon the 
extent of current judicial inquiry in three areas: the motivation of, the criminal 
procedures in, and the threat of persecution posed by the requesting state. This 
Comment then examines three proposed models of judicial action formulated 
by Congress to deal with these concerns. Finally, the Comment concludes with 
an assessment of the models analyzing their potential for reconciling competing 
U.S. goals in the extradition process. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF EXTRADITION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Since ancient times, nations have relied upon extradition primarily as a po-
litical tool to secure the return of enemies of the state.27 By the end of the 
19 See, e.g., House Hearings I, supra note 9; House Hearings II, supra note 9. 
20 See, e.g., House Hearings I, supra note 9; House Hearings II, supra note 9. 
21 See, e.g., House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 56, 58-59, (testimony of Morton Halperin, Director, 
Center for National Security ~tudies). 
" See, e.g., id. at 87, 93-97 (testimony of Steven Lubet, Professor of Law). 
23 Id. at 95. 
24 See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 354 (1983) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. 225). 
25 See H.R. REP. 998, supra note 12, at 4. 
26 !d. at 5-6. 
27 See Epps, The Validity of the Political Offender Exception in Extradition Treaties in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence, 20 HARv. INT'L LJ. 61, 62 (1979); Cantrell, The Political Offense Exemption in International 
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eighteenth century, however, two changes in society forced states to shift the 
focus of their extradition practices. First, new forms of transportation and 
communication, developed during the advent of the industrial revolution, raised 
the spectre of increasingly sophisticated international crime.28 Second, events 
such as the revolutions in the United States and France spurred a recognition 
of the legitimacy of political dissent during the Age of Enlightenment.29 
Prodded by the threat of unmanageable waves of fugitives moving fteely 
across national borders, states began entering into expanded extradition agree-
ments to protect their own security. 30 At the same time, the acceptance by 
enlightenment theorists of political dissent as ajustifiable,31 even noble, activity32 
led many nations to include provisions within extradition agreements removing 
political offenders from the reach of illiberal states. 33 Thus, in 1834, France 
and Belgium entered into the first extradition treaty containing an exception34 
for political offenders.35 
Extradition: A Comparison of the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland. 60 MARQ. L. REV. 
777.782 (1977). Cf. S. BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 16 (1968). 
28 See Research in International Law Under the Auspices of the FaCUlty of the Harvard Law School, 29 AM. 
J. INT'L. L. SuPP. 15, 35-38 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Research]. 
29 Epps, supra note 27, at 63. 
30 Harvard Research, supra note 28, at 42-43. 
31 See Garcia-Mora, The Present Status of Political Offenses in the Law of Extradition and Asylum, 14 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 371, 372 (1953). As John Stuart Mill observed: "Political liberties or rights which it was 
to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe, and which, if he did infringe, Specified 
resistance, or general rebellion, was to be held justifiable." J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 2 (1847). 
32 BEDI, supra note 27, at 180-81. 
33 See Garcia-Mora, supra note 31, at 373-74, stressing the humanitarian rationale for development 
of the political offense exceptioh. Compare Hannay, Legislative Reform of u.s. Extradition Statutes: 
Plugging the Terrorist's Loophole, 13 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 53 (1983). Hannay observes that "the 
'political offense' exception functions as a useful mechanism by which states may avoid becoming 
entangled in the internal political upheaval of other nations." Id. at 59. In the recent case of Quinn v. 
Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793 (9th Cir. 1986), the court cited three justifications upon which the 
exception is grounded: 
First, its historical development suggests that it is grounded in a belief that individuals have 
a 'right to resort to political activism to foster political change.' ... Second, the exception 
reflects a concern that individuals - particularly unsuccessful rebels - should not be returned 
to countries where they may be subjected to unfair trials and punishments because of their 
political opinions ... .Third, the exception comports with the notion that governments -
and certainly their nonpolitical branches - should not intervene in the political struggles of 
other nations. 
34 2 BASStoUNI, supra note 4, ch. 8 § 2 at 2 n.7. Though the 1834 treaty between France and Belgium 
was the first to explicity exclude political offenses, in 1833 France and Switzerland substantively 
adopted the same approach by deleting "crimes contre la surete de I'Etat" from the list of extraditable 
offenses contained in an existing treaty. See Deere, Political Offenses in the Law and Practice of Extradition, 
27 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 250 (1933). 
35 The term "political offense" has been applied to two categories of alleged crimes, "pure" and 
"relative" political offenses. A purely political offense is directed "against the political organization or 
government of a state, injuring only public rights, and containing no common crime element what-
soever," whereas a "relative" political offense is connected in some way with a common crime. Deere, 
id. at 248. 
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These historical events influenced extradition practices in the United States.36 
In the early years of the republic, the country was reluctant to enter into 
extradition agreements fearing that the threat of rendition might impede the 
flow of immigrants.37 Additionally, in the wake of the colonial overthrow of 
British rule, pride in the new nation as a refuge for those in need of asylum 
coupled with a mistrust of monarchical regimes, rendered the practice of ex-
tradition distasteful to many in the United States. 38 By the mid-1800s, however, 
a growing awareness of the need to combat transnational crime and the avail-
ability of the political offense exception prompted the country to begin entering 
into extradition treaties. 39 
The enactment of the first U.S. extradition statute shortly followed. 40 Though 
extradition treaties in the United States are considered self-executing,41 legis-
lation dealing with extradition was designed to facilitate implementation of these 
agreements by providing uniformity of procedures.42 Though the political of-
fense exception was not specifically included in the statute, requested individuals 
were guaranteed a hearing and thus furnished with a forum within which to 
raise the political offense exception.43 Beginning with the 1843 extradition 
agreement between France and the United States,44 an exception for political 
offenders became a standard clause in U.S. extradition treaties. 45 
By virtue of the political offense exception, U.S. courts were able to protect 
persons charged with political crimes from potential mistreatment by a request-
36 Harvard Research, supra note 28, at 2-43. 
37 [d. 
38 Id. 
39 [d. Though the Jay Treaty of 1794 between the United States and Britain contained a limited 
provision for the return of those accused of murder or forgery, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 
1842 was the first full-scale extradition agreement. [d. at 73. 
For a list of bilateral extradition treaties entered into by the U.S., see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3181 (1985). 
40 Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 167,9 Stat. 302-03. 
41 6 WHITEMAN, supra note 3, at 734. 
42 Id. Public support for the formation of implementing procedures arose in the wake of the 
controversial case of United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825 (D. S.C. 1799) (no. 16,175). Great Britain 
requested the extradition of an alleged British citizen and Royal Navy member, one Thomas Nash, 
known to the Americans as Jonathan Robins, on charges of mutiny and murder aboard a British 
vessel. Robins at 826. Popular sympathy ran with Robins who claimed that he was actually an American 
citizen who had been impressed into the British navy and had merely been attempting to escape in 
the midst of a mutiny by the crew. [d. at 827. In the absence of established procedures, the case came 
before the District Court in South Carolina on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus accompanied by 
a recommendation from the Secretary of State urging Robins' extradition. [d. at 841-42. The court 
refused to grant habeas corpus relief and Robins was returned to England where he was tried and 
executed. Id. at 893. Questions concerning the procedural fairness and uncertain legal basis of the 
review accorded to Robins by President Adams and the court led to a call for a statute to implement 
extradition agreements. 
43 See id.; Lubet, supra note 8, at 249. 
44 Treaty of Extradition, Nov. 9, 1843; United States-France, art. 4, 8 Stat. 580, T.S. No. 89. 
45 Epps, supra note 27, at 63. 
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ing state.46 This defense was only available to those individuals who could prove 
that their acts fit within the rather narrow definition of behavior held to con-
stitute a political offenseY Thus, the focus of judicial inquiry was the political 
nature of the act for which the alleged offender was sought, without regard to 
the treatment the individual would receive upon return to the requesting state. 
Individuals who did not qualify as political offenders could not raise claims 
before the courts relating to potential mistreatment by a requesting state.48 
Courts generally referred questions concerning the permissibility of a reques-
tor's motives,49 the fairness of that state's criminal procedures,5o threats of state 
persecution, and other humanitarian matters to the executive branch. 51 This 
refusal to entertain pleas relating to the treatment likely to be accorded an 
individual upon rendition, came to be referred to as the "Rule of Non-In-
quiry."52 
Since 1875, U.S. courts have recognized that the President, by virtue of the 
constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs,53 possesses broad discretion-
ary power to make the final decision whether to extradite an individual.54 
Though some commentators have suggested that this authority to deny extra-
dition is limited by the obligations imposed upon the U.S. by the applicable 
treaty, 55 the exact scope of the Executive's power has never been expressly 
delineated.56 Thus, the President, through the Secretary of State, may deny57 
or impose conditions upon58 an extradition request where circumstances indi-
cate that the individual might be mistreated by the requesting state. In practice, 
however, the Secretary has consistently refused to deny extradition on grounds 
46 Banoff & Pyle, supra note 6, at 182. 
47 Courts in the U.S. have basically adhered to the original British definition of political offense 
articulated in the 1891 case In re Castioni [1891] 1 Q.B. 149 (1890). 2 BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, ch. 8 
§ 2 at 25-26. A court explicitly adopted the Castioni definition in the frequently cited case of In re 
Ezeta, 62 F. 972, 999 (N.D. Cal. 1894). In Eain v. Wilkes, the 7th Circuit observed that in order to 
constitute a political offense, there must be "a violent political disturbance in the requesting country 
at the time of the alleged acts, and that the acts charged against the person whose extradition is sought 
were recognizably incidental to the disturbance." 641 F.2d at 516. See also the 9th Circuit's decision in 
Quinn, 783 F.2d at 792-803, for an extensive review of the historical background and modern 
treatment of the political offense exception in U.S. courts. 
48 See Banoff & Pyle, supra note 6, at 207. 
49 In re Ezeta, 62 F. at 986; In re Lincoln 228 F. 70, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1915). 
50 Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971); In re Ryan, 360 F. Supp. 
270,274 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). 
51 Peroff, 542 F.2d at 1249. 
52 Banoff & Pyle, supra note 6, at 188-89. 
53 U.S. CON ST. art. 2, § 2. See also L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 45-50 (1972). 
54 See In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 296, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 13,563). 
55 Executive Discretion, supra note 5, at 1315-16. 
56 Quinn, 783 F.2d at 789. 
57 Executive Discretion, supra note 5, at 1315. 
58 6 WHITEMAN, supra note 3, at 1051-53. 
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of procedural fairness,59 and indeed, from the limited evidence available to the 
public, it appears that executive discretionary refusal has rarely been exercised.60 
These procedural safeguards, developed during the 19th century in response 
to the protection of individuals within the extradition process, have passed 
virtually unaltered into the 1980s.6l But technological advances62 and evolving 
conceptions of individual rights have created pressure for changes in the exist-
ing extradition structure.63 Air travel, advanced weaponry, drug trafficking, and 
guerrilla warfare pose new challenges to the suppression of international crime 
and the preservation of national security.64 Critics of the present system contend 
that the courts' interpretation of the political offense exception ignores the 
reality of illegitimate forms of political dissent and fear that the United States 
has become a haven for terrorists.65 They advocate a narrowing of this exception 
in order to exclude those who engage in acts of terrorism.66 
Conversely, widespread violations of individual rights perpetrated during the 
Second World War awakened international interest in defining basic human 
rights and designing ways to protect them. 67 Promulgation of various interna-
tional instruments such as the United Nations Charter,68 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights,69 the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,7° and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees7l 
has spurred discussion in the United States on the content of internationally 
recognized human rights and how these rights affect domestic practices such as 
extradition.72 This heightened concern for the protection of individual rights 
has led some commentators to question the ability of the present extradition 
59 See, e.g., Executive Discretion, supra note 5, at 1325. 
60 From 1941 to 1962 only two extraditions are believed to have been denied by the executive 
branch. ld. at 1328. In a 1980 interview, K. Eugene Malmborg, an Assistant Legal Advisor for the 
State Department, stated that in his 14 years of experience he had no knowledge of an instance when 
the Executive had refused to return a fugitive who had not fallen within the political offense exception. 
Banoff & Pyle, supra note 6, at 192 n.88. See also, Quinn, 783 F.2d at 789-90. 
61 Lubet, supra note 8, at 253-54. 
62Id. at 254. 
63 See House Hearings I, supra note 9, at 69-70 (testimony of Falk); House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 
83 (testimony of Helton); Anderson, supra note 7, at 164. 
64 D. Lauter, There's No Place To Hide, NAT'L L. J. Nov. 26, 1984, p. 1 col. 1. In 1979 the United 
States was involved in approximately 150 extraditions, both as the sending and receiving state. In 1982 
the figure had risen to 350 and is expected to increase further. !d. at p. 28 col. 2. 
65 Extradition Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1639 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 
25,30 (1981) (statement of Attorney William Hannay) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. 
66 Hannay, supra note 33, at 66-75. 
67 See SIEGHART, supra note 2, at 14. 
68 U.N. CHARTER. 
69 G.A. Res. 217 A. U.N. Doc. N81O, at 71 (1948). 
70 G.A. Res. 2200 A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. N6316 (1966). 
71 19 U.S.T. 6224, TIAS No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
72 See generally 2 BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, ch. 10 § I, at 10. 
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process to adequately protect persons from potential abuse by a requesting 
state.73 Factors such as these have convinced Congress of the need for statutory 
reform and have sparked a debate on the role that the judicial branch should 
play in safeguarding the individual in the extradition process.74 
III. EXTRADITION PROCEDURES IN THE UNITED STATES 
Extradition in the United States will only be granted pursuant to a valid treaty 
with the requesting state.75 Unlike the extradition agreements of many other 
nations,'6 U.S. extradition treaties generally provide for the rendition of na-
tionals, as well as aliens.77 The proceedings against an individual are governed 
by both the substantive requirements of the pertinent treaty and the procedural 
rules set out in the U.S. extradition statute.78 
According to the statute, an authorized representative of a foreign state may 
initiate extradition proceedings against an alleged offender by filing a com-
plaint.79 The complaint must refer to the relevant treaty provisions upon which 
the request is based and specify the charges brought against the individual. 80 
On the basis of this complaint, an arrest warrant may be issued and, following 
apprehension of the suspect, a hearing held.81 
The purpose of the hearing is two-fold. First, the court must decide whether 
the request complies with the provisions of the relevant extradition treaty.82 
The requesting country must show that the crime constitutes an extraditable 
73 See Anderson, supra note 7, at 164. 
74 See infra text accompanying notes 206-85. 
75 18 V.S.C. § 3181; 6 WHITEMAN, supra note 3, at 734. 
76 See generally 2 BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, ch. 8 § 3 at 1. "As a general rule, European states exempt 
nationals while common law states do not." [d. 
77 See, e.g., Charlton v. Kelly, 229 V.S. 447, 465 (1912). V.S. treaties generally contain three types of 
provisions relating to the surrender of nationals. The first type provides for the extradition of "all 
persons." Courts have consistently held that this language includes nationals. [d. at 447-57. The 
second, and most common treaty provision states "neither of the contracting parties shall be bound to 
deliver up its own citizens or subjects under the stipulations of this convention." Though not bound 
to extradite nationals under this provision, in recent years V .S. policy has favored such rendition. See 
2 BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, ch. 8 § 3 at I. The last type provides that "[nleither of the contracting 
parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens under the stipulations of this convention, but the 
executive authority of each shall have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed 
proper to do so." Many recent treaties have adopted this language. Id. at 2. 
78 6 WHITEMAN, supra note 3, at 734. 
79 18 V.S.C. § 3184. The complaint can be filed directly in V.S. courts by the requesting state. 6 
WHITEMAN, supra note 3, at 905. Sometime prior to the final extradition decision, however, a formal 
request must be made to the Department of State. Id. But see the guidelines fot extradition procedure 
set out in Eain. 641 F.2d at 508. 
80 18 V.S.C. § 3184. 
8! Id. 
82Id. 
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offense as contemplated in the agreement83 and that the act is prohibited by 
the laws of both nations.84 The second purpose of the hearing is to examine 
the charges in order to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to justify 
rendition of the individual to stand trial for the alleged offenses.85 Courts have 
repeatedly stressed that this statutorily mandated extradition proceeding is not 
a full hearing on the merits of the case; the actual guilt or innocence of the 
defendant is not at issue.86 
Thus, the courts use a probable cause standard87 to ascertain whether the 
evidence supports a reasonable belief that the individual is guilty of the crime 
charged.88 Since the hearing is preliminary in nature,89 the Federal Rules of 
Evidence are inapplicable90 and the requesting state may introduce a wide range 
of proof in order to show probable cause.91 Courts sharply limit the type of 
evidence that the defendant is permitted to present in order to avoid turning 
the hearing into a trial on the merits.92 The alleged offender may only introduce 
evidence designed to explain the circumstances of the offense93 or to show that 
he or she is not the person sought for the crime. The defendant may not 
"' Id.; Jimenez v. Aristeguieta. 311 F.2d 547. 562-63 (5th Cir. 1962). 
84 This has been termed the requirement of "double criminality." See Collins v. Loisel. 259 U.S. 309. 
311 (1922): 
The law does not require that the name by which the crime is described in the two countries 
shall be the same; nor that the scope of the liability shall be coextensive. or. in other respects. 
the same in the two countries. It is enough if the particular act charged is criminal in both 
jurisdictions. 
Id. at 312. Of course. if the extradition treaty explicitly waives the double criminality requirement. 
extradition will be allowed. Factor v. Laubenheimer. 290 U.S. at 301. 
85 18 U.S.c. § 3184 (1976). 
86 See Jimenez. 311 F.2d at 556. Eain. 641 F.2d at 508. 
87 Jimenez. 311 F.2d at 562. The court in Jimenez discussed the origin of the probable cause standard. 
Id. 
Probable cause was given its classic definition on April I. 1807. by Chief Justice John Marshall 
... [h]e held that he should not require evidence to convince himself that the defendant was 
guilty. but only that 'furnishing good reason to believe that the crime alleged had been 
committed by the person charged with having committed it.' 
88 Charlton. 229 U.S. at 459-62. 
89 Benson v. McMahon. 127 U.S. 457. 462-63 (1887). The court explained that the extradition 
hearing has the character of 
/d. 
Those preliminary examinations which take place every day in this country before an exam-
ining or committing magistrate for the purpose of determining whether a case is made out 
which will justify the holding of the accused. either by imprisonment or under bail. to 
ultimately answer to an indictment. or other proceeding. in which he shall be finally tried 
upon the charge made against him. 
9() Fed. R. Evid. llOl(d)(3). See generally H.R. REP. 998. supra note 12. at 21; Eain. 641 F.2d at 508. 
91 Loisel. 259 U.S. at 316-17; Eain. 641 F.2d at 508. "Hearsay is admissible. and the foreign govern-
ment usually presents its case through affidavits. depositions. and other written statements." /d. 
92 Charlton. 229 U.S. at 461-62; H.R. REP. 998. supra note 12. at 21; In re Shapiro. 352 F. Supp. 
641.644-45 (S.D.N.V. 1973). 
93 Id. at 645. The court noted that "[t]he fugitive's right is limited to adducing evidence which 
explains rather than contradicts the supporting proof." See also Jimenez. 311 F.2d at 556. 
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introduce proof contradicting the case presented by the requesting nation.94 
The presiding magistrate possesses great discretionary power to grant or deny 
the admission of evidence.95 
The U.S. extradition statute contains no provision allowing for a direct appeal 
of the court's decision as to the extraditability of the individua1.96 A defendant 
wishing to challenge the court's findings may only seek collateral relief by filing 
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.97 In the past, the courts have restricted 
the scope of their habeas corpus review,98 focusing solely on questions relating 
to jurisdiction, the existence of a valid treaty, and the identity of the defendant. 99 
Recent cases indicate, however, that courts are broadening the scope of this 
review to include challenges to the constitutionality of the U.S. government's 
conduct in the extradition proceedings. loo A person opposing extradition on 
any other ground must apply for executive discretionary review for relief. lol 
Once a court has found an individual extraditable, the matter is then certified 
to the Secretary of State. 102 Rendition will not occur until the Secretary has had 
a chance to review the court's proceedings to determine whether treaty require-
ments have been met and a surrender warrant should issue. lo3 The Secretary 
may rely on the court's record or conduct a de novo examination of the issues. 104 
Based upon this review, the Secretary may deny extradition for any of a variety 
of technical, political, or humanitarian reasons. I05 Thus, where a court has 
approved an extradition request, the final decision whether to extradite lies 
within the executive branch's sole discretion. lo6 
If, however, the court denies extradition, finding that the requesting nation 
has failed to produce evidence sufficient to support the complaint, or that the 
defendant is entitled to the protection of a relevant defense, this decision is 
94 Eain, 641 F.2d at 511. 
95 Loisel, 259 U.S. at 317. 
96 See Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369 (1919). The most recent versions of both the House and 
Senate extradition reform would change current law by providing the alleged offender with a right 
of direct appeal. H.R. REp. 998, supra note 12, at 7; S. REP. 225, supra note 24, at 333. 
97 See Miller, 252 U.S. at 364, Greci v. Birkes, 527 F.2d 956, 958 (1st CiT. 1976). 
98 Eain, 641 F.2d at 508, Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925). 
99 Fernandez, 268 U.S. at 312. 
100 See Matter of Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1484 (7th CiT. 1984) holding "that federal courts undertaking 
habeas corpus review of extraditions have the authority to consider not only procedural defects in the 
extradition procedures that are of constitutional dimension, but also the substantive conduct of the 
United States in undertaking its decision to extradite if such conduct violates constitutional rights." 
See also Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 348 (4th Cir. 1983). 
101 Set, e.g., Eain, 641 F.2d at 508. 
102/d. 
103 Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289-90 (1901); Executive Discretion, supra note 5, at 1314. 
104 [d. at 1328. 
105 [d. 
106 [d. 
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final. The executive branch has no power to appeal or alter the court's verdict. 107 
The court's decision, however, does not operate as res judicata; a requesting 
state may refile the extraditon request before a different magistrate if dissatisfied 
with the denial. l08 
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE: THE EROSION OF THE RULE OF NON-INQUIRY 
Courts in the United States have traditionally refused to consider questions 
relating to the political motives of a requesting state and the procedures or 
treatment which await an individual upon rendition. 109 Though not bound by 
treaty or statute to refrain from looking into these matters, 110 courts have chosen 
to refer such considerations to the discretion of the Secretary of State. lll This 
practice has been termed the "rule of non-inquiry."1l2 However, recent cases1l3 
and new treaties recognizing the need to more actively protect basic human 
rights, cast doubt on the continuing validity of this rule and indicate the courts' 
willingness to assume a more active role in these areas. 114 
A. Political Motivation of the Requesting State 
Perhaps the most clear-cut instances of judicial abstention have occurred when 
the requested individual contends that the extradition request is politically 
motivated. ll5 An early indication of the courts' reluctance to actively intervene 
in the extradition process appeared in In Re Lincoln. 116 The alleged offender 
challenged an extraditon request from the United Kingdom, claiming that the 
charge of forgery was being used as a subterfuge to secure his return in order 
107 Eain, 641 F.2d at 508. 
108 Loisel, 262 U.S. at 429; United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 495 (2d Cir. 1986). The most 
recent versions of extradition reform legislation in both the house and senate provide for direct appeal 
of the extradition decision by either party in an extradtion case. See H.R. REP. 998, supra note 12, at 
32-33; S. REP. 225, supra note 24, at 351-52. 
109 See, e.g., Garcia-Guillem, 450 F.2d at 1192. (Court observed that they were not "permitted to 
inquire into the procedure which awaits the appellant upon his return" to the requesting country of 
Peru). 
110 See House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 55 (testimony of Daniel W. McGovern, Deputy Legal 
Advisor, Dept. of State). 
111 See, e.g., In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1915); Matter of Locatelli, 468 F. Supp. 568, 575 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
112 Banoff and Pyle, supra note 7, at 188-89. 
m See e.g., Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960); Nicosia v. Wall, 442 F.2d 1005, 1006-
07 (5th Cir. 1971); Matter of Burt, 737 F.2d at 1484-85. 
114 I BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, ch. 7 § I at 8. 
115 The motivation of the requesting country is not currently considered in determining whether an 
individual is entitled to claim the political offense exception. Eain, 641 F.2d. at 504. The courts have 
limited the applicability of the exception to acts committed in furtherance of a political uprising or 
disturbance. !d. 
116 228 F. at 70, 74. 
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to punish him for statements he had made which were critical of the govern-
ment. ll7 The court declined to entertain the requested individual's objections 
noting that "it is not a part of the court proceedings nor of the hearing upon 
the charge of crime to exercise discretion as to whether the criminal charge is 
a cloak for political action, nor whether the request is made in good faith."118 
According to the court, the Secretary of State could furnish the requested 
individual with adequate safeguards to ensure that Britain intended to live up 
to its treaty obligations. 1I9 
Two considerations have influenced the courts in this area. First, the courts 
have taken the position that the political branches of government are responsible 
for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Thus, they are reluctant to question the 
good faith of the actions of a country with whom the United States has entered 
into an extradition agreement. 120 This principle led the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Garcia-Guilleran v. United States l21 to refuse to recognize the former 
Peruvian Minister of Education's contention that the Peruvian government 
intended to try him on charges other than embezzlement.122 The court observed 
that it was "not at liberty to speculate that the Republic of Peru will not recognize 
and live up to the obligations existing between it and the United States."123 
Second, the courts have determined that the motives of the requesting state 
are political matters more aptly assigned to the "sole organ"124 of the conduct 
of foreign policy, the executive branch. 125 For this reason, the court in Eain v. 
Wilkes l26 declined to consider the alternative motives behind Israel's request for 
the return of an alleged PLO terrorist, noting that "evaluations of the motivation 
behind a request for extradition so clearly implicate the conduct of this country's 
foreign relations as to be a matter better left to the Executive's discretion."127 
Despite these influences, examination of a requesting state's motives has not 
been universally resisted. In the case of In Re Mylonas, 128 the Greek government 
requested the extradition of Mylonas, an anti-communist hero from the Greek 
civil war who later served as president of a city council. A communist faction 
117 [d. at 73-74. 
118 [d. at 74. 
119 [d. 
120 Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911). 
121 450 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1971). 
122 [d. at 1192. 
123 [d. 
124 U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 324, 330. 
125 House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 95 (statement of Lubet). 
126 641 F.2d at 504. 
127 [d. The court contrasted the fact-finding nature of the political offense exception inquiry with 
the more subjective, policy-oriented determination necessary to ascertain the motive of a requesting 
state. 
128 187 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ala., 1960). 
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later won control of the town and initiated charges of embezzlement against 
Mylonas. He then emigrated to the United States, with the knowledge of the 
Greek government. Some time after his departure, the town government rein-
stated proceedings against Mylonas and convicted him in absentia. 129 During the 
extradition hearing, the district court judge admitted a wide range of evidence 
on the political climate in the town during the time of Mylonas' conviction. 130 
Though the court rested its decision not to extradite Mylonas on a technicality,l3l 
it was apparently influenced by the alleged political motivation inspiring the 
request. 132 
B. Fairness of Procedure in the Requesting State 
U.S. courts have generally refused to admit evidence of alleged fundamental 
unfairness of a foreign state's criminal proceedings as a defense to extradition. 133 
They have adhered to the principle that the existence of a valid extradition 
treaty attests to the acceptability of trial procedures in a signatory state. 134 
Additionally, in Neely v. Henkel,m the Supreme Court made it clear that consti-
tutional due process guarantees are inapplicable to trials in foreign states for 
crimes committed outside the United States in violation of another nation's 
laws. 136 A requested individual "cannot complain if required to submit to such 
modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of that country may prescribe 
for its own people, unless a different mode be provided for by treaty stipula-
tions. "137 
In compliance with these principles, courts in the United States have largely 
avoided the task of examining the criminal procedures of a foreign state for 
constitutional violations or for any degree of minimum fairness. 138 They have 
129Id. at 719. 
130Id. at 718-20. In Mylonas. the court traced the political power struggle between the communist 
and anti-communist factions in the town for an eight year period. Id. 
131 Id. at 721. Article V of the extradition treaty governing the case stipulated that an individual 
might be exempt from prosecution due to a '''lapse of time or other lawful cause ... · /d. The court held 
that "[i]n this age of rapid communication and transportation there is little or no justification for 
waiting more than three years from the initiation of a prosecution before taking steps to apprehend 
the accused. when. at all times intervening. his whereabouts were fully known to the prosecuting 
authorities of Greece." Id. 
132 See House Hearings I. supra note 9. at 62 (statement of Attny. David Carliner. Int'l Human Rts. L. 
Group); 1 BASSIOUNI. supra note 4. ch. 7 § 7 at 1-3. 
m See Ex parte La Mantia. 206 F. 330. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); BASSIOUNI supra note 4. ch. 7 § 7 at I. 
134 Glucksman. 221 U.S. at 512. 
135 180 U.S. 109 (1901). (Petitioner filed request for writ of habeas corpus on various counts relating 
to an extradition request from Cuba on charges of embezzlement). 
136Id. at 122. 
137 /d. at 123. 
138 See. e.g .• Gallina v. Fraser. 278 F.2d 77. 78 (2d Cir. 1960). 
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considered matters relating to the acceptability of proceedings in a requesting 
state to be appropriate subjects for discretionary executive review. '39 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, expressed dissatisfaction 
with this inability to ensure any protection to extradited individuals from unfair 
practices in the requesting state in Arguento v. H orn.140 There the court confessed 
to uneasiness over the prospect of returning a fugitive to Italy on the basis of 
an in absentia conviction. HI 
The first unambiguous indication of judicial willingness to create an exception 
to the rule of non-inquiry, in certain circumstances, came from the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Gallina v. Fraser,'42 also involving an in absentia 
conviction. H3 The plaintiff, after fleeing to the United States in an effort to 
elude capture, was found guilty of robbery in two separate Italian trials. H4 After 
surveying prior case law, the Gallina court admitted that they were not autho-
rized to inquire into the fairness of the Italian proceeding which permitted 
conviction in the absence of the defendant. '45 The court added an important 
caveat, confessing "to some disquiet at this result. We can imagine situations 
where the relator, upon extradition, would be subject to procedures or punish-
ment so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to require re-
examination of the [rule of non inquiry]."'46 The court then found that this 
case did not merit application of any exception to the rule of non-inquiry.147 
Despite its availability, no court has yet held that circumstances in an extra-
dition case warrant use of the Gallina exception. H8 Some courts in the second 
circuit, however, have speculated on situations that might trigger application of 
I .. Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976). 
,.0 241 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1957). Italy requested extradition of petitioner on the basis of a murder 
conviction in abstentia issued thirty years prior to the request. [d. at 259. 
,., [d. at 263-64. The court noted, 
[t)he appellant has apparently been a law-abiding person during the thirty years that he has 
been in this country. To enter a judgment that will result in sending him back to life 
imprisonment in Italy, upon the basis of the record before the Commissioner, does not sit 
easily with the members of a United States court .... 
[d. 
142 278 F.2d at 77. 
I .. [d. at 78. 
I •• [d. at 78. For a more complete recital of the facts of the case as adopted by the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, see 177 F. Supp. 856, 861-62 (D. Conn. 1959). 
145 278 F.2d at 78-79. 
,.6 [d. at 79. 
,.7 [d. The Court was apparently persuaded that Gallina's trial was not so devoid of fundamental 
fairness as to merit further inquiry. [d. During the first trial, despite his absence, Gallina was repre-
sented by counsel and in the second he was tried along with his associates in the robbery who were 
present at the trial and also convicted. [d. Although the State Department approved Gallina's extra-
dition, they conditioned his return upon Italy's agreement to furnish him with a new trial. 6 WHITEMAN 
supra note 3, at 1120. Gallina was sent to Italy, but under Italian law, could not be given a new trial. 
[d. He was released and returned to the United States. [d. 
148 Anderson, supra note 7, at 156. 
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the exception. In United States ex. reI. Bloomfield v. Gengler,149 the court proposed 
that an "inability to assert a defense" might be such an instance. 15o In Rosado v. 
Civeletti l51 the court intimated that where evidence indicated officially sanctioned 
torture and abusive criminal proceedings, the presumption of fairness accorded 
to a requesting nation might be abandoned. 152 
If courts follow these suggestions, they may then be under a duty to scrutinize 
the foreign state's proceedings to discover whether there exist minimal safe-
guards to ensure a fair trial. Thus, courts seeking to apply the Gallina exception 
will be confronted with the job of defining what fundamental procedural safe-
guards are vital to the conduct of a fair trial. 
Beyond some sort of acceptable standard of minimum fairness, the Rosado 
court also pointed out that constitutional due process guarantees might, in fact, 
pose a barrier to the rendition of a requested individual. 153 The court acknowl-
edged the principle that due process protection does not apply extraterritorially 
to proceedings brought pursuant to a crime committed outside the United States 
in violation of the laws of another state. 154 The court noted, however, that the 
Constitution does govern the manner in which U.S. officials may join in the 
efforts of the prosecuting country.155 
Most recently, two companion cases, Plaster v. United States l56 and Matter of 
Burt,I57 discussed the limits the Constitution imposes upon the acts of the U.S. 
government in the extradition process. Both cases illustrate the federal courts' 
attempts to balance the government's responsibility to conduct foreign affairs 
through extradition agreements, with the protection of the rights of the indi-
vidual whose return is sought. 158 In Plaster, a former U.S. soldier was sought by 
149 507 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974). 
150 [d. at 928. Two American citizens were convicted in abstentia for conspiracy to import hashish 
by a Canadian court. Id. at 926. They contended that the trial violated their right to due process. Id. 
at 928. As in Gallina, the court concluded that the facts did not present evidence significant enough 
to merit review. Id. The appellants had been present at the trial and represented by counsel, but 
voluntarily chose to leave before its conclusion. /d. at 929. 
151 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980). 
152Id. at 1195. This case did not involve an extradition request. The petitioners, two American 
citizens, were convicted in sham proceedings in a Mexican court and subject to degradation and 
torture. Id. at 1184-86. Pursuant to the terms of a newly executed prisoner transfer treaty between 
the U.S. and Mexico, they were allowed to return to the U.S. to serve their sentences on the condition 
that they agreed to abandon any claims in U.S. courts against the Mexican government's proceedings. 
Id. at 1188-89. Petitioners sought a writ of habeas corpus claiming that their continued detention in 
the U.S. violated due process. /d. at 1192. Though the court admitted the petitioners had a right to 
bring the habeas corpus challenge, they denied the claim on policy grounds. Id. at 1198-200. 
mId. at 1195-96. 
154Id. at 1195. 
155Id. at 1194-95. 
156 720 F.2d 340, 340 (4th Cir. 1983). 
157 737 F.2d 1477, 1477 (7th Cir. 1984). 
158 See id. at 1485; M. Leigh, Judicial Decisions: Plaster v. United States, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 672, 675 
(1984). 
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West Germany for crimes he allegedly committed while stationed there. 159 Plas-
ter contended that the United States could not constitutionally order his extra-
dition due to an agreement he signed with U.S. law enforcement officials 
promising him immunity from prosecution in any subsequent criminal pro-
ceedings in exchange for his testimony.16o 
The government responded that the constitutionalit.y of the extradition de-
cision was an issue that fell outside the area of limited judicial review in a habeas 
corpus proceeding, and that consideration of that issue was committed solely to 
the President and the Secretary of State. 161 While acknowledging the wide scope 
of executive discretion in making the final extradition decision,162 the Plaster 
court firmly reserved the power to review the constitutionality of the govern-
ment's actions. 163 Regardless of treaty obligations, the court held that the gov-
ernment may not extradite an individual "where such extradition would ... 
violate the individual's constitutional rights."164 The court concluded that the 
government'S breach of a valid prosecutor-defendant agreement constituted 
just such an impermissible violation of due process rights. 165 
In Burt, another former U.S. soldier contested the government's decision to 
extradite him to West Germany to stand trial for crimes committed fifteen years 
earlier.166 Unlike the claim in Plaster, however, the challenge in Burt centered 
on the length of time that had elapsed between the alleged crime and the 
extradition proceedings. 167 Burt contended that in contradicting its original 
decision not to return him to West Germany, the U.S. government violated his 
right to due process and a speedy trial. 168 
As in Plaster, the court held that constitutional restraints apply to the govern-
ment's extradition decisions. 169 In defining these limitations, however, it distin-
guished between the standards to be applied to the government acting as 
prosecutor in U.S. criminal proceedings, and as extraditer in its foreign affairs 
[d. 
159 720 F.2d at 343-44. 
160 !d. at 346. 
161 [d. at 347-49. 
162 [d. 
163 [d. The court stated. 
[aJlthough the power and the discretion of the Executive is undoubtedly great in matters of 
foreign relations, the cases to which we have referred demonstrate that the exercise of this 
power is limited by the provisions of the federal Constitution. And. unquestionably. it is the 
province of the judiciary to adjudicate claims that governmental conduct is in violation of the 
Constitution. 
164 [d. 
165 !d. at 351. 
166 737 F.2d at 1482. 
167 !d. 
168 [d. 
169 [d. at 1484. 
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capacity.170 The court observed that by virtue of the "special prosecutor-defen-
dant relationship" the government exerts a unique control over the fate of the 
accused. l7l Thus, in bringing an alleged offender to justice, the government 
must adhere strictly to the full range of constitutional provisions designed to 
protect the defendant's rights. 172 
In contrast, a less direct relationship exists between the U.S, government and 
a requested individual. 173 In this context, the government'S actions are primarily 
concerned with carrying out the Executive's duty to conduct foreign policy 
rather than with the ultimate prosecution of the alleged offender.174 The court 
recognized, however, that decisions based on diplomatic considerations might 
affect the ability of an extradited individual to defend against charges brought 
by the requesting state. 175 Hence, governmental conduct is subject to some 
restraints. 176 
The Burt court noted that the constitutionality of the government's actions in 
extraditing an individual would be judged by a less stringent standard than that 
employed in reviewing the acts of the government as prosecutor. 177 Though 
officials may not violate the basic notions of "fair play and decency" implicit in 
the due process clause of the fifth amendment, the court refused to unduly 
hamper the Executive's power to conduct foreign policy.l7B Specifically, the court 
held that extradition decisions must be formed without regard to constitutionally 
impermissible factors such as race, color, sex, national origin, religion, and 
political beliefs, and that the decisions must conform to "such other exceptional 
constitutional limitations as may exist because of particularly atrocious proce-
dures or punishment employed by the foreignjurisdiction."179 The court found 
that the time delay in prosecuting Burt did not so substantially violate due 
process as to pose a constitutional barrier to his extradition. ISO 
Though the extent of the impact of Burt has yet to be ascertained, the case 
appears to mandate constitutional restraints upon extraditon where circum-
stances indicate an individual may be subject to "atrocious procedures or pun-
ishment" upon rendition. lSI Thus, under this criterion, a court may abandon 
non-inquiry and review questions relating to the procedural fairness likely to 
17°Id. at 1486-87. 
171Id. at 1486. 
172Id. 
mId. at 1486-87. 
174 /d. at 1487. 
"'Id. 
176Id. 
I77 [d. at 1486. 
178Id. at 1486-87. 
179 [d. at 1487. 
180Id. 
181Id. 
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be accorded an individual. The aim of the court's investigation would not be to 
attempt to apply U.S. constitutional standards to those foreign proceedings, but 
to determine whether it is constitutionally permissible for the U.S. government 
to decide to return the alleged offender. 
C. Persecution and Punishment in the Requesting State 
Courts have traditionally refused to consider the threat of persecution, 182 
extreme forms of punishment,183 or other humanitarian factors as a bar to 
extradition. In the wake of Gallina and Burt courts may be entitled, or even 
required, to assume a more active role in this area. Indeed, there are indications 
that courts may already have begun to evaluate the likelihood of human rights 
abuses. In Ambjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States,184 the requested individual, an 
Icelandic national, challenged her country's extradition request on the ground 
that she would be subject to "brutal and unfair" treatment upon her return. 185 
The court, relying on Gallina, indicated that in view of Iceland's outstanding 
human rights record and the appellant's unsubstantiated prediction of mistreat-
ment, it would allow her extradition. 186 The court concluded that it was under 
no obligation to hold an evidentiary hearing to consider the merits of the 
claim. 187 Thus, the court appeared to apply a prima facie standard to the Gallina 
line of inquiry. 
This prima facie standard was also applied in Prushinowski v. Samples. 188 The 
court examined the claim of the requested individual, a Chassidic Jew, that he 
would starve to death in a British prison because of the authorities' unwillingness 
to comply with his religious dietary laws. 189 The court rejected Prushinowski's 
argument, observing that he would be treated no differently from any other 
British prisoner; any problems he experienced would be under his own con-
trol. 190 Although finding extradition was proper under these circumstances, the 
IB, The case of In Re Normano, 7 F. Supp. 329 (D. Mass. 1934), has been cited as the most glaring 
example of non-inquiry into the threat of persecution. See House Hearings [, supra note 9, at 145-46 
(statement of Att'y. Keara O'Dempsey). There, the court refused to take judicial cognizance of the 
potential abuse the requested individual, a Jew, might suffer at the hands of Germany during World 
War II if the extradition request was honored. 7 F. Supp. at 330-31. 
1B' Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1107 (5th Cir. 1980). Mexico sought petitioners' 
extradition on charges of attempted kidnapping of the Cuban consul and a related murder. [d. at 
1101. The court refused to entertain petitioner's objections to the Mexican criminal proceedings 
despite the fact that their confessions to the acts may have been obtained by "means of torture." [d. 
at 1103. 
lB4 721 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1983). 
lB5 [d. at 683. 
IB6 [d. 
IB7 [d. 
lBB 734 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1984). 
lB9 [d. at 1018. 
190 [d. at 1019. 
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court went on to suggest that threats of abusive punishment might in fact 
constitute grounds for a denial of extradition if, for instance, "the prisons of 
the foreign country regularly opened each day's proceedings with a hundred 
lashes applied to the back of each prisoner who did not deny his or her God 
or conducted routine breakings on the wheel for every prisoner."191 
The courts may be under a duty to inquire into evidence of potential perse-
cution if the individual is a refugee within the meaning of the Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees. 192 The Protocol 193 defines a refugee as an individual 
who is unable or unwilling to return to the country of nationality or habitual 
residence due to a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion 
.... "194 According to the Protocol, however, refugee status may be denied to 
a person if there are "serious reasons" for believing that the individual has 
committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refl!ge prior to 
admission as a refugee, a crime against peace or a crime against humanity.195 If 
a person qualifies as a refugee, the Protocol forbids the individual's return 
unless a reason exists to regard the individual as a security risk to the country 
of refuge or a danger to the community.196 
Since the Protocol applies to requested persons in an extradition hearing, 197 
courts may be permitted to ignore the rule of non-inquiry in cases alleging 
potential for persecution. 198 This would appear to explain the court's action in 
Nicosia v. Wall. 199 Though the court affirmed the district court's finding that the 
requesting country of Panama had presented sufficient evidence to justify the 
extradition of the alleged offender, it remanded the case back to the lower 
court with instructions to consider the affect of the Protocol on the individual's 
extraditability. The court pointed out that "the United States intends to enforce 
the terms of that protocol and to deny extradition in cases in which it is 
demonstrated that a fugitive's life or freedom would be threatened on account 
of his political opinion."20o Thus, due to the Protocol, the lower court was 
191/d. 
192 See, House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 60 (statement of Halperin). 
193 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4,1967,19 V.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 
V.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter cited as Refugee Protocol]. The Protocol substantially incorporates the 
provisions of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1961, 19 V.S.T. 6259, 
T.I.A.S. no. 6577, 189 V.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter cited as Refugee Convention], which has not been 
ratified by the V.S. 
194 Refugee Protocol, art. I (2), incorporating the definition of refugee set out in the Refugee 
Convention, ch. I art. I (A)(2) as amended. 
195 Refugee Protocol, at art. 1(2), incorporating Refugee Convention, ch. 1 art. I(F). 
196 Refugee Protocol, art. 1(1) incorporating Refugee Convention. ch. 1 art. 33. 
197 1 BASSIOUNt, supra note 4, ch. 3 § 5 at I. 
198 [d. at 2. 
199 442 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1971). 
200/d. at 1006-07. 
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specifically instructed to consider matters which would otherwise fall within the 
rule of non-inquiry. 
An example of the obligations the Protocol has placed upon the courts to 
consider these matters was offered in Sindona v. Grant. 201 Despite an admitted 
reluctance to inquire into the potential abuse the requested person might suffer 
if Italy's extradition request were granted,202 the court tacitly acknowledged the 
applicablility of the Protocol.203 In Sindona, however, the court used the serious 
tlOn-political crime exception contained within the Protocol, to avoid examina-
tion of the claim of threatened persecution. The court held that fraudulent 
bankruptcy was a sufficiently serious crime to trigger operation of the Protocol's 
exception hence removing the Protocol as an obstacle to the individual's extra-
dition.204 Thus, future use of the Protocol as a deterrent to extradition on 
humanitarian grounds may hinge on judicial interpretations of what constitutes 
suth a "serious crime."205 
V. STATUTORY REFORM 
Increased willingness on the part of the courts to inquire into treatment 
awaiting a requested individual206 reflects a heightened concern in the United 
States with the protection of fundamental human rights within the extradition 
process. Despite general agreement on the need to safeguard these rights, recent 
legislative attempts to reform the extradition statute reveal a division of opinion 
over the appropriate role of the courts.207 
Three possible models of judicial action have emerged from the debate. The 
first model seeks to foreclose judicial review of these questions by codifying the 
rule of non-inquiry.208 The second model, taking recent case law into account, 
proposes to retain the court's limited discretion to exercise judicial review when 
faced with conduct that shocks the conscience.209 The third model goes beyond 
current practice by imposing an affirmative duty upon the courts to inquire 
201 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1980). 
2021d. at 174-75. In Sindona, the court stated that Gallina did not require them to consider whether 
circumstances awaiting the fugitive would offend their sense of decency. ld. at 175. 
203/d. at 174. 
2041d. 
205 In the context of asylum proceedings, courts and scholars have looked to the "Handbook on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees" for guidance in defining the term "serious non-political 
crime" as well as other terms within the Protocol. See House Hearings 11, supra note 9, at 81 (statement 
of Helton). 
206 See supra text accompanying notes 138-205. 
207 See generally H.R. REP. 998, supra note 12. at 62-63, 65-67; S. REP. 225, supra note 24, at 353-
54. 
208 S. REP. 225, supra note 24, at 354; H.R. REP. 998, supra note 12, at 30. 
209 H.R. REP. 998, supra note 12, at 30. 
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into the motives of a requesting country and the treatment that awaits the 
individual if returned.210 
A. ModelOne: The Rule of Non-Inquiry 
Model One, embodied in the original 1982 House version211 of extradition 
reform legislation and the most recent Senate proposal,2I2 provides that the 
motivations of a requesting nation and the subsequent treatment of an extra-
dited person are essentially matters of foreign policy, which are within the scope 
of the political branches and, therefore, outside the competency of the court.213 
A refusal to extradite on these grounds should only be made by the executive 
branch, pursuant to its constitutional duty to regulate the conduct of foreign 
affairs.214 This statutory scheme codifies the traditional rule of non-inquiry by 
explicitly vesting all power to deny extradition, on the basis of questionable 
motives or humanitarian concerns, in the Secretary of State.215 Courts, by im-
plication, are forbidden to entertain humanitarian defenses.216 
210 [d. at 30-3!. 
211 H.R. 2643, The Extradition Act of 1983, was introduced on April 20, 1983. House Hearings II, 
supra note 9, at 2. Proposed § 3194(e)(4) of the bill assigned questions concerning the motives of and 
procedures in a requesting state to the sole discretion of the Secretary of State. [d. at 14-·15. This bill 
was subsequently amended to give the courts the freedom to exercise judicial review of these matters. 
See H.R. REP 998, supra note 12, at 5-6. 
212 The latest version of the Senate extradition reform bill was introduced as Part M of the Com-
prehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, S. 1762. The same legislation was also separately introduced 
as S. 220 by Senator Strom Thurmond. S. REP. 225, supra note 24, at 332 n.!. The provisions of S. 
1762 dealing with extradition were favorably reported out by the Senate Judiciary Committee, [d. at 
1-2, and the Foreign Relations Committee, S. REP. No. 241, 98th Congo 1st Sess. 1983, [hereinafter 
cited as S. REP. 241]. The bills, however, were never acted upon by the full Senate during the 98th 
Congress. 
213 See S. REP. 241, supra note 212, at 17. Section 3196 of the Foreign Relations Committee's reported 
bill reads, in relevant part: 
Id. 
a) Responsibility of the Secretary of State - If a person is found extraditable pursuant to section 
3194, the Secretary of State, upon consideration of the provisions of the applicable treaty and 
this chapter ... 
3) may decline to order the surrender of the person if the Secretary determines that-
A) The foreign state is seeking extradition of the person for the purpose of 
prosecuting or punishing the person because of his political opinions, race, religion, 
or nationality; or 
B) The extradition of the person to the foreign state seeking his return would be 
incompatible with humanitarian considerations. 
The Secretary may order the surrender of a person who is a national of the United States 
unless such surrender is expressly forbidden by the applicable treaty or by the laws of the 
United States. A decision of the Secretary under paragraph ... 3) is final and is a matter 
solely within the discretion of the Secretary and is not subject to judicial review. In determining 
the application of paragraph 3), the Secretary shall consult with the appropriate bureaus and 
offices of the Department of State, including the bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs. 
214 See, e.g., S.REP. 225, supra note 24, at 353-54. 
215 H.R. REP. 998, supra note 12, at 4. 
216 [d. 
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Clearly, this model represents a departure from recent cases such as Gallina217 
and Burt,218 in which courts have carved out exceptions to the rule of non-
inquiry and reserved the right to review questionable procedures and punish-
ments in limited circumstances.219 Model One adherents view such judicial 
forays as encroachments upon the Executive's prerogative in foreign affairs.220 
Advocates of Model One perceive the protection of individual rights as inex-
tricably tied to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.221 They stress the adverse 
political consequences that might follow a decision to deny extradition on these 
grounds.222 Within this framework, an executed extradition treaty between the 
United States and another nation represents the judgment of the political 
branches that rendition of alleged fugitives to that country is appropriate.223 In 
recognition of the fact that many of these treaties were entered into years ago 
and that governments and political climates have changed dramatically,224 Model 
One supporters acknowledge that in certain circumstances extradition may be 
undesirable.225 Such a denial may be viewed, by the requesting nation, as an 
affront to its honor.226 A refusal to extradite on this basis involves a political 
decision that goes beyond treaty interpretation and is more akin to the consid-
eration involved in treaty-making. Thus, in conformity with the separation of 
powers doctrine, such decisions should be entrusted to the political branches of 
government, not to the courts.227 
Under this formulation, the individual is best protected by the executive 
branch with its experience in foreign policy and knowledge of international 
conditions.228 The legislative language of Model One requires the Secretary of 
State to consult with the Department of State, and particularly with those 
217 See supra text and accompanying notes 142-53. 
218 See supra text and accompanying notes 166-8l. 
219 See supra text accompanying notes 142-8l. 
220 House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 94-95 (testimony of Lubet). 
221 See id. at 95; H.R. REp. 998, supra note 12, at 66. 
222 H.R. REp. 998, supra note 12, at 66. 
223 See House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 96. In his testimony Professor Lubet asserted, 
It is important to bear in mind that a foreign nation may only request extradition pursuant 
to a valid treaty. Thus, every extradition case necessarily will involve a treaty which has been 
negotiated and executed by the President and ratified by a two-thirds majority of the Senate. 
In other words, a political decision already will have been made concerning the general 
appropriateness of extradition to the foreign state. 
Id. See also id. at 55, (discussion between Sen. William Hughes, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm., 
Subcomm. on Crime; Daniel McGovern, Dept. of State and Roger Olsen, Asst. AU'y. Gen., Dept. of 
Justice). 
224Id. at 154-55 (discussion between Lubet and Sen. Hughes). 
225Id. 
226Id. at 96, 154 (testimony, Lubet). 
227 See id. at 154; House Hearings I, supra note 9, at 106-07 (discussion between Prof. M. Cherif 
Bassiouni and Sen. Hughes). 
228 See S. REp. 225, supra note 24, at 354; H.R. REP. 998, supra note 12, at 66. 
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bureaus concerned with the protection of human rights,229 which have access 
to information on the subject of human rights. Presumably, the Secretary of 
State would then make an extradition decision balancing the interests of the 
individual against other national interests.23o 
Considerations of foreign policy aside, Model One questions the ability of the 
courts, as an institution, to engage in the type of inquiry necessary to ascertain 
danger to an individual.231 Judicial activism would breed uncertain and incon-
sistent results, according to this Model, due to the difficulty of creating standards 
by which to judge the conduct of a requesting government.232 As a Model One 
supporter noted, "how does one prove that a foreign government is motivated 
by a desire for political vengeance, rather than a desire to punish a common 
criminal? Is the requesting government benign or cruel, honest or disingenuous, 
fair or repressive? These questions ultimately lie closer to opinion than to 
fact."233 Model One adherents fear that these subjective factors will lead to 
unpredictable outcomes; what may be antithetical to one court's sense of decency 
may be acceptable to another.234 Therefore, centralized decision making in the 
Secretary of State, assuring a greater degree of uniformity, may be preferable.235 
B. Model Two: The "Rule of Restraint" 
Model One would undoubtedly curtail the court's evolving role in the pro-
tection of individual rights within the extradition process.236 In recognition of 
this fact, some congressional reformers have proposed a second model of ju-
dicial involvement237 that would allow the court to retain its "implicit authority 
to make such inquiries in cases where the facts would 'shock the conscience' of 
the court."238 In its most recent form, this change would be accomplished by 
deleting from the statute any language suggesting that inquiries into questions 
related to humanitarian concerns are solely the concern of the Secretary of 
State.239 
229 See proposed § 3196(a) in S. REP. 241, supra note 212, at 17. 
230 House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 174-75. 
2" See House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 88, 94-95 (testimony of Lubet); H.R. REP. 998, supra note 
12, at 66. 
232 See House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 88, 94 (testimony of Lubet). 
'" !d. at 95. 
234 See House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 55 (testimony of Olsen). 
235 Id. at 387 (testimony of Lubet); H.R. REP. 998, supra note 25, at 66. 
236 H.R. REP. 998, supra note 12, at 4. 
237Id. Model Two is embodied in an amendment proposed by Rep. Charles Schumer and adopted 
by the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime. Id. at 4. This was subsequently replaced 
by an amendment proposed by Rep. Robert Kastenmeier which is discussed in part C. of this section. 
!d. See infra text accompanying notes 236-60. 
2" H.R. REP. 998, supra note 12, at 30. 
239Id. at 4. An alternative formulation of this approach has been suggested by Prof. Bassiouni. House 
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Though Model Two adherents acknowledge that inquiries in this area may 
be tinged by foreign policy considerations, they maintain that this does not 
preclude judicial involvement. 24o They point out that courts currently hear 
requests for political asylum241 and cases brought under the Alien Tort Claims 
Statute,242 which also involve the conduct of foreign affairs. Indeed, Model Two 
supporters appear to be influenced by the fact that recent cases243 and inter-
national agreements such as the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees244 
may actually require judicial attention in circumstances evidencing a clear threat 
of persecution.245 
Model Two disputes the claims of judicial incompetence and inconsistency 
raised by Model One.246 Legislative supporters of Model Two contend that 
limited judicial review has already served as an important safeguard for re-
quested persons,247 and stress the courts' long history and experience adjudi-
cating cases involving individual rights. 248 The exact content of the "shock the 
conscience" test contemplated by this model is not fully defined. One commen-
tator has proposed that courts might choose to ground their denial in existing 
international instruments binding upon the United States249 such as the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights,250 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights251 and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. 252 
Hearings II, supra note 9, at 276-77. He recommended that the statute explicitly include language 
recognizing the power of the courts to conduct this limited review. He proposed the following provi-
sion: 
Upon a prima facie showing by the requested person that he or she is likely to be subjected to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, extradition shall not be granted 
unless the requesting state shall present to the Secretary of State satisfactory assurances that 
such treatment or punishment shall not be imposed; or where a treaty between the United 
States and the requesting state for transfer of prisoners exists, that the extradition shall be 
conditional upon the return of the relator upon conviction for the execution of the sentence 
in the United States. The Secretary of State shall negotiate these conditions in accordance 
with Section 3196 and their terms shall be presented to the court and made part of the order. 
Only in the most egregious cases shall the court deny extradition. The Secretary of State may 
in any event exercise his discretion after a finding of extraditability by the court. 
!d. at 277. 
240 House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 276-77 (testimony of Bassiouni). 
241 See, e.g., id. at 57 (testimony of Halperin); id. at 82 (testimony of Helton). 
242 Banoff and Pyle, supra note 7, at 208-09. 
243 House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 80 (testimony of Helton); 386 (testimony of Hon. Peter Palmero, 
Magistrate, S. Dist. Fla.). 
244 See Refugee Protocol, supra note 193. See also House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 276 (testimony 
of Bassiouni). 
245 See supra text accompanying notes 182-205. 
246 Banoff and Pyle, supra note 7, at 207-09. 
247 H.R. REP. 998, supra note 12, at 30. 
248 Banoff and Pyle, supra note 7, at 208-09. 
249 House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 276 (testimony of Bassiouni). 
25oG.A. Res. 217 A, U.N. Doc. N81O, at 71 (1948). 
251 G.A. Res. 2200 A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). 
252 O.A.S. Official Records Ser. KlXVIII.I, Doc. 65, Rev. I, Corr. I, Jan. 7, 1970. 
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Alternatively, a court might base its decision on constitutional limits to extra-
dition arising from "particularly atrocious procedures or punishment" suggested 
by the Burt court.253 
Adherents of Model Two envision that the court's limited review will intrude 
only slightly upon the Secretary of State's traditional discretionary authority.254 
This model contemplates deference to executive recommendations that would 
be sought by the court during the hearing process. 255 Judicial intervention would 
occur only in the most egregious cases256 and could be tempered by the use of 
conditional orders of extradition257 and prisoner transfer agreements.258 
Finally, those favoring Model Two suggest that limited court review may 
actually assist the executive branch's conduct of foreign policy by providing the 
State Department with a judicial shield in controversial cases.259 In situations 
where a denial of extradition is desirable, yet might embarrass the government, 
the Secretary of State would have the benefit of a judicial determination in a 
politically sensitive case. Thus, the court's decision would be the target of foreign 
criticism, leaving the executive branch free to mend relations with the requesting 
country.260 
C. Model Three: The Affirmative Duty to Inquire 
The most recent version of the House extradition proposal26l departs from 
current practice by imposing an affirmative duty upon the courts to examine 
253 See supra text accompanying notes 166-81. 
254 House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 59 (testimony of Halperin) cf id. at 85 (testimony of Helton). 
255 [d. at 58-59 (testimony of Halperin). 
256 [d. at 277. (testimony of Bassiouni). 
257 [d. at 266. 
258 [d. 
259 House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 265-66 (testimony of Bassiouni). Compare similar reasoning 
used by Prof. Lubet to argue that the courts should continue to decide the political offense question. 
[d. at 143-44. 
260 [d. at 265-66 (testimony of Bassiouni). 
261 House Resolution 2643 was amended by the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime to 
include a proposal formulated by Rep. Kastenmeier which imposes an affirmative duty on the courts 
to inquire into these matters. H.R. REP. 998, supra note 12, at 5-6. The clean bill, as amended, was 
introduced and approved by the full Judiciary Committee as H.R. 3347. § 3194 of the amended bill 
provided, in relevant part: 
(d)(2) The court shall not order a person extraditable after a hearing under this section if 
the court finds ... 
(D) the person has established by a preponderance of the evidence that such person-
(i) is being sought for prosecution or punishment because of such person's race, religion, 
sex, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion; or 
(ii) would, as a result of extradition, be subjected to fundamental unfairness. 
(e)(I)(A) Upon motion made by the person sought to be extradited or the Attorney General, 
the United States district court may order the determination of any issue under subparagraph 
... (D) of subsection (d)(2) of this section by a judge of such court. 
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whether a request is politically motivated or whether the person, upon rendition, 
would be subject to persecution or fundamental unfairness.262 This third model 
of judicial action acknowledges the expertise of the Secretary of State in dealing 
with these cases. The model is also premised, however, on the notion that the 
courts, as impartial arbiters, have a significant part to play in ensuring that the 
extradition process is not used as a subterfuge to engage in human rights 
violations.263 Proponents of Model Three would place this initial determination 
in the hands of the courts to ensure that extradition denials based on human-
itarian grounds will not be influenced by potential political repercussions.264 
Thus, the individual can rely on an independent tribunal to safeguard his or 
her rights265 and, as in Model Two, the executive branch can claim the benefit 
of the judicial shield.266 
This model, in effect, establishes two new legal defenses to extraditon that 
may be entertained by the court upon motion of the requested individual after 
an initial finding of extraditability.267 First, the court may consider whether the 
individual "is being sought for prosecution or punishment because of such 
person's race, religion, sex, nationality, membership in a particular social group 
or opinion."268 This inquiry mirrors that mandated by the Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, and is essentially the same as that undertaken by a court 
in deciding a request for political asylum under immigration law.269 
Even if the court finds that the person has not met the burden of proving 
that he or she faces a threat of persecution, the requested individual may raise 
a second defense based upon the fundamental unfairness of criminal proce-
dures in the requesting country.270 The House Judiciary Committee reporting 
on the proposed legislation offered illustrations of the possible applications of 
this standard, suggesting that fundamental unfairness would result if an indi-
vidual was denied: 
(B) No issue under subparagraph ... (D) of subsection (d)(2) of this section shall be 
determined by the court and no evidence shall be received with respect to such issue-
(i) unless the person sought to be extradited gives notice at a reasonable time before the 
hearing under this section of the intention to raise such issue; and 
(ii) unless and until the court determines the person sought is otherwise extraditable. 
[d. at 52. The full Judiciary Committee passed this portion of the bill, as amended, by a vote of 16 to 
15. H.R. REP. 998, supra note 12, at 65. Subsequently, the bill was favorably reported by the Foreign 
Affairs Committee but was not acted on by the 98th Congress before adjournment. 
262 H.R. REP. 998, supra note 12, at 5. 
263 [d. at 30-31. 
264 See House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 58 (testimony of Halperin); Banoff and Pyle, supra note 7, 
at 209. 
265 See House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 392 (testimony of Att'y. Abdeen M. Jabara). 
266 [d. at 58 (testimony of Halperin). 
267 See H.R. REp. 998, supra note 12, at 5-6, and relevant provisions of proposed bill at 52. 
268 [d. at 52. 
269 [d. at 5. 
270/d. at 52. 
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1) the right to an independent and impartial tribunal; 
2) the right to be informed of the crimes charged; 
3) the right to a conviction based upon individual responsibility; 
4) the right to be present at trial; 
5) the right to present a defense; 
6) protection against ex post facto liability of penalty; or 
7) protection against compulsory or tortured self-incrimination.27l 
Supporters of Model Three contend that modern political realities dictate a 
more active role for the courts in order to secure individual rights. 272 First, they 
argue that the existence of an extradition treaty no longer ensures that a 
requesting nation will live up to its obligations of good faith, because the 
governments with whom these agreements were executed are sometimes no 
longer in power.273 The presumption of good faith may be inappropriate given 
a new regime or form of governance.274 Indeed, Model Three proponents point 
out that the United States currently has extraditon agreements with countries 
that have been cited for widespread and recurring human rights abuses.275 
Therefore, under this approach, courts would no longer accept the mere exis-
tence of a treaty as an indication of a country's integrity when evidence to the 
contrary exists.276 
Second, Model Three adherents believe that the political branches of govern-
ment alone cannot be relied upon to adjust the extradition structure in the 
United States to protect requested individuals.277 The international political 
repercussions that might follow a decision to terminate an extradition treaty 
are seen as deterrents to action by the executive branch.278 Similarly, Model 
Three supporters cite political constraints to explain why executive discretionary 
power to deny extradition has rarely been used.279 Given these preoccupations 
with policy concerns, the executive branch cannot be expected to adequately 
protect individual rights within the extradition process.280 Under Model Three, 
court involvement would place humanitarian concerns above diplomatic consid-
erations when the protection of individual rights is at stake, thus making extra-
dition a "matter of law, not foreign policy."28l 
271 [d. at 6. 
272 See id. at 58-59. 
273 [d. at 62; See House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 83 (testimony of Helton). 
274 H.R. REP. 998, supra note 12, at 61-62. 
275 [d. at 62; House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 83 (testimony of Helton). See also House Hearings [, 
supra note 9, at 64 (testimony of Falk). 
276 H.R. REP. 998, supra note 12, at 61-62. 
277 [d. at 62-64; House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 57 (testimony of Halperin). 
278 H.R. REP. 998, supra note 12 at 61-62. 
279 House Hearings [, supra note 9, at 52 (testimony of Carliner). 
280 [d.; House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 77 (testimony of Helton), at 389-90 (letter from Helton to 
Subcomm. on Crime). 
281 Senate Hearings, supra note 65, at 112 (statement of Prof. Christopher H. Pyle). 
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Model Three does contemplate a continuing role for the executive branch, 
despite its emphasis on the advantages of independent judicial review.282 The 
proposed legislation actually mandates executive participation at the hearing 
stage by requiring the Secretary of State to furnish relevant information to the 
court.283 Practically, due deference would probably be accorded to the State 
Department's recommendations. Lastly, if the court certified an individual's 
extraditability, the ultimate decision to extradite would still lie within the Sec-
retary's discretion.284 
VI. CONCLUSION: ASSESSING THE MODELS 
In order to deal effectively with questions relating to the motivations behind 
an extradition request, and the procedures and punishment that await an in-
dividual upon rendition, any new statutory scheme must adequately respond to 
the twin concerns underlying the current extradition process. The appropriate 
model of judicial action must 1) recognize the legitimate use of extradition as a 
means of carrying out the Executive's constitutional responsibility to advance 
U.S. policy interests,285 while 2) ensuring that the return of a particular individ-
ual comports with the U.S. commitment to implement modern standards of 
international human rights.286 
Model One clearly recognizes the importance of extradition as a policy tool. 
Undoubtedly, the discretion vested in the Secretary of State allows the executive 
branch to take into account the various political ramifications presented by an 
extradition request. 287 It provides the Executive with a discrete and flexible 
method by which to balance the threat to an individual against diplomatic 
considerations.288 However, Model One fails to take into account that over the 
past few decades, the courts have also played a part in this process by holding 
open the possibility of intervention in cases shocking to the conscience.289 
Indeed, the very flexibility and discreteness of executive review may be its 
major flaw. The lack of documentary evidence makes difficult the task of eval-
uating the Secretary of State's past performance in considering these types of 
282 H.R. REP. 998, supra note 12, at 63. 
283 [d. at 52. 
284 [d. at 55. 
285 See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 48-50 (1975). 
286 Banoff and Pyle, supra note 7, at 209. For an analysis of recent attempts to integrate human 
rights into U.S. foreign policy, see D. HEAPS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: THE FIRST 
DECADE 1973-1983, 15-44 (1984). See also HENKIN, supra note 285, at 98. 
287 Executive Discretion, supra note 5, at 1313. 
288 [d. at 1328. 
289 See supra text accompanying notes 140-205; H.R. REp. 998, supra note 25, at 30. 
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claims.290 Requested individuals seeking to assert a defense based on humani-
tarian grounds have, under executive review, little information by which to 
assess the potential success of their claims.291 The secrecy that shrouds the 
process of executive review leaves open a very real possibility for unchallenged 
dismissal of a valid claim on grounds unrelated to humanitarian concerns.292 
Model Three eliminates this uncertainty by providing individuals with a public 
forum in which to present evidence relating to this type of claim.293 Imposing 
upon the courts an affirmative duty to review an individual's claim that extra-
dition would result in persecution is consistent with U.S. obligations under the 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 294 The courts have already proven 
competence in addressing this issue in cases such as Nicosia and Sindona. 295 
Model Three, however, may go too far in attempting to rectify the difficulties 
posed by Model One. The second type of inquiry mandated by Model Three, 
which requires courts to delve into the fundamental unfairness of a requesting 
state's criminal procedures, presents a special problem of its own. To expect 
another nation to assure a wide-ranging slate of procedural safeguards akin to 
our own constitutional guarantees, may go well beyond the commitment that 
nation entered into in signing an extradition treaty.296 If the United States seeks 
to ensure that specific procedural rights will be accorded to an individual upon 
return to a requesting nation, the political branches of government may un-
dertake the task of amending existing treaties to provide such guarantees.297 
An additional difficulty inheres in the use of the term "fundamental unfair-
ness." U.S. constitutional guarantees are not binding on foreign tribunals. 29B 
Courts, in conducting a full scale review of a requesting nation's procedures, 
may apply U.S. constitutional standards extraterritorially.299 Second, what is 
considered fair in one country may elicit disapproval in another. 30o Only the 
290 For conflicting assessments of the Secretary of State's success in addressing issues relating to 
humanitarian concerns see House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 88 (statement of Lubet); H.R. REP. 998, 
supra note 12, at 66; House Hearings J, supra note 8, at 145-46 (statement of O'Dempsey). 
291 See Senate Hearings, supra note 65, at 101 (statement of Pyle); Executive Discretion, supra note 5, at 
1315, 1328n.116. 
292 House Hearings II, supra note 8, at 57-58 (testimony of Halperin). 
293 See supra text accompanying notes 263-66. 
294 See supra text accompanying notes 192-98, 243-45, 268-69. 
295 See supra text accompanying notes 199-205. 
296 House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 55 (discussion between Olsen, McGovern and Sen. Hughes). 
297 House Hearings J, supra note 9, at 67-68 (discussion between Falk and Sen. Hughes). 
298 See supra text accompanying notes 134-37. 
299 Id. 
300 House Hearings II, supra note 9, at 55 (testimony of Olsen). For a comparative study of differences 
that exist among criminal procedures in various nations, see generally HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, (J. Andrews ed. 1982). In his introductory essay, the editor 
observes: 
[hlow are we to define what we mean by human rights in the context of criminal procedure? 
This is not an easy task. Until 1898 the accused in English law was not allowed to give evidence 
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most egregious cases should result in a court's denial of an extradition request 
on the grounds of fundamental unfairness. 301 
In this sense, Model Two represents a fair compromise in viewing the criminal 
procedures of a requesting state. Courts have retained the authority to entertain 
evidence of clearly abusive proceedings but have declined to engage in a general 
condemnation of the system of a requesting state.302 Thus, to resolve the prob-
lems posed by the fundamental unfairness language, Congress might choose to 
limit the court's review to instances of particularly abusive proceedings which 
shock the conscience of the court.303 This type of review, in conjunction with 
the inquiry into potential threats of persecution proposed by Model Three, 
would offer an individual protection consonant with current U.S. human rights 
policy. Executive review could then complement this process by allowing the 
Secretary of State to refuse extradition where the procedures of a requesting 
state preclude a fair trial, or other humanitarian considerations weigh against 
extradition. This system would allow both the judiciary and the Executive to 
respond to concern for the individual while preserving flexibility in the conduct 
of foreign policy. 
Tracey Hughes 
on his own behalf. Now in England this would be regarded as one of the most fundamental 
of all rights, whereas in Germany and Belguim and indeed elsewhere in Europe the position 
is not so straightforward. 
/d. at 9. 
'01 [d. at 276-77 (statement of Bassiouni). 
,o2 See supra text accompanying notes 133-81. 
'03 See supra text accompanying notes 247-53. 
